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Parties' enter an international agreement with assumptions and ex-
pectations as to its impact. These expectations and assumptions in turn
form the basis for future policies anticipated by the agreement. Expec-
tations about the future course of relations between the parties will be
shaped by their assumptions about the events leading to the agreement.
The parties may have made some of their expectations explicit during
the negotiating process while others remained implicit. Some assump-
tions may be shared and understood at the time of agreement; others
may remain submerged until subsequent events reveal them.
Traditional analysis has treated the effect of crisis (usually war) on
international agreements as a unique phenomenon. Once war is de-
clared, parties may be able to suspend or terminate treaties. This Arti-
cle will view the impact of crisis in a broader perspective. Any changes
in underlying expectations can alter the expected value of the agree-
ment. The parties must then weigh the treaty's benefits, consider modi-
fications of the performance process, and anticipate the demands that
in turn may be made by other parties. The range of responses, as well
as the possible changes in circumstances giving rise to them, are wide
and diverse. This Article will focus on the criteria parties should use to
make and evaluate claims relating to international agreements in times
of crisis and the criteria the world community should use to evaluate
those claims.
I. The Theoretical Framework
This Article will analyze the effect of crisis on international agree-
" Senior Lecturer in Law, National University of Singapore. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the kind assistance of Professors Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman
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1. The parties to an international agreement can be any international actors, such as
States, international organizations, private parties, and even individuals. In this Article,
"parties" refers to States unless otherwise noted.
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ments in contextual fashion. The crisis and the parties' responses to it
cannot be separated from their expectations and perceptions. Any
analysis of the validity and lawfulness of the responses must also take
the context into account.
A. Dofnition of "Crisis"
A crisis is a change in circumstances that threatens the values on
which the agreement rests. A crisis occurs when political elites perceive
a threat to their own position or to the security of the State itself. The
elites then urge extreme measures to restore the situation or neturalize
the threat. The elites may be parties to a number of international
agreements containing obligations contrary to the policies they wish to
pursue in the face of these changed conditions, and so they will have to
determine how far they can compromise these obligations.
A determination that a "crisis" exists reflects the parties' perceptions,
not a declaratory analysis of facts. Because the perception of threat
arises from the impact of events on the expectations and values of the
parties, a crisis cannot be separated from its context.2 Except for natu-
ral disasters, most crises do not occur suddenly but stem from a series
of perhaps seemingly trivial acts that threaten group values.3
The crisis only need affect one of the parties to change the expecta-
tions of many;4 indeed, it may only affect a third State not party to the
agreement. Serious famine or a sudden change in a State's economic
position caused by a fall in the price of a vital export will alter the value
of certain agreements. A State may perceive internal changes in the
power structure of another as an ideological threat of crisis
dimensions.5
The crisis may threaten values other than power or security.
Epidemics of infectious diseases or a chronic "brain drain" could lead
to demands to modify lng-standing international obligations. An elite
2. See Delaume, Excusefor Non-Peiformance and Force Majeure in Economic Develop-
ment Agreements, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 242, 263 (1971) ("Under the circumstances
the paramount consideration is much less the occurrence of a particular event than its im-
pact upon the carying out of the venture and the response of the parties in relation thereto.")
3. See generally C. BELL, THE CONVENTIONS OF CRIsIs (1971); W. CHURCHILL, THE
GATHERING STORM (1948). Of course, the inevitability of crisis may seem much clearer in
retrospect. See C. BELL, supra, at 23 ("twenty-twenty hindsight").
4. See Note, The Effects of Domestic Hostilities on Public and Private InternationalAgree-
ments: A Tentative Approach, 3 W. L. REv. 128 (1964) (study of effect of internal revolution
on treaties; proposes that English municipal doctrine of frustration be used as starting point
for solution of problem).
5. The United States perceived Cuba's adoption of a Marxist-Leninist form of govern-
ment, an internal event, as a threat to essential community values of the hemisphere. See 56
AM. J. INT'L L. 604-08 (1962) (report of 1962 O.A.S. Conference).
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may view economic changes threatening a State's financial stability as a
crisis. 6 Changes in affection or respect between elites may vitally affect
the value of mutual assistance or military cooperation treaties.
7
Deteriorating relations between States involving measures far short
of open warfare can affect treaty regimes.8 On the other hand, war may
not constitute a crisis if elites of different States anticipate future con-
ffict. The outbreak of hostilities could accord with rather than defeat
their expectations and thus involve no threat to the values on which the
agreement rested.9
In addition, the institutional world community could act to oblige
nations to suspend or terminate treaty obligations with an international
law-breaker. While such authoritative determinations are rare, they do
6. In 1971, the United States government decided that balance of payments deficits and
inflation rates had reached such levels that they threatened the stability of international
trading arrangements. The United States deemed emergency measures justified, regardless
of the terms and policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) and of
the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). Without denouncing these international com-
mitments, the U.S. government implemented regulations that conflicted with them. Jackson,
The New Economic Policy and United States International Obligations, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
110 (1972). The United States may have considered the U.S. dollar and the U.S. position in
international commerce to be of such paramount importance to the world economic system
that a failure to act, which arguably would threaten the stability of that entire system, would
constitute irresponsible behavior. While the measures adopted did not comply with the le-
gitimate expectations of the other elites party to these economic agreements, those actions
may still be justified in the long term.
Both G.A.T.T. and the I.M.F. can impose sanctions for deviant behavior. The repeated
failure of the global community to use these powers may suggest tolerance of such deviation.
Such tolerance may even be, in practice, desirable. Jackson describes a "respectable body of
opinion" that considers deviance necessary to show the need to reform the system. Id. at
117-18.
7. For example, Ethiopia and Somalia switched sides in the Cold War in the mid-1970's
because their patrons failed to support their local interests with sufficient vigor. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
8. While war obviously is the paradigm of crisis, the distinction between "peace" and
"war" has become increasingly blurred in the modem world. The policies developed in this
Article do not depend on the location of this inexact line. In the large number of armed
clashes since the Second World War, formal declarations of war have been exceedingly rare.
See D. WooD, CONFLICT IN THE TWENIETH CENTURY (1968); Arbitration Award between
Dalmia Cement, Ltd., New Delhi (India) and the National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi (Paki-
stan), Dec. 18, 1967, reprintedin Documents fied by Pakistan, Appeal Relating to the Juris-
diction of the I.C.A.O. Council, I.C.J. Pleadings 748 (1973) (discussion of problem of
defining the onset of war in absence of a declaration). In addition, hostilities may be overt
or covert. Covert hostilities include instances where one State shelters or assists groups in its
own territory that then attack selected targets in another State. Such conflicts can seriously
threaten the victim, and the same policies should apply to claims made against this back-
ground as apply to other, more conventional conflict situations. Cf. Bowett, Reprisals Involv-
ing Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (1972) (reprisals against guerrilla
activity "have proved to be productive of greater violence rather than a deterrent to
violence").
9. See the discussion of the India-Pakistan "serial war" at text accompanying notes 84-
85 infra.
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represent instances of a legal crisis leading to demands to modify
agreements.I0
Whatever the causes, crises will vary in intensity, duration, and seri-
ousness. The appropriateness of the response to the crisis is therefore
similarly contextual. A decision-maker should determine the responses
according to the level of intensity and coercion involved. A reaction
deemed appropriate for a moment of intense threat may be considered
ill-advised or arbitrary at an earlier or subsequent moment.
B. The Decision Process: Interests and Actors
Once a crisis exists, States will make their demands and counter-de-
mands known through diplomatic channels or regional or world fora.
Other actors with stakes in international agreements will also press
their own interests. Private parties may have depended on interna-
tional obligations for their legitimate financial or personal interests."I
Most of the municipal case law on treaty suspension or termination has
involved the rights of individuals in treaties during wartime. In addi-
tion, private interests may help determine national policy regarding an
agreement. In making and evaluating these demands, decision-mak-
ers-whether other elites or an impartial third party before whom the
claims have been brought-should consider the interests of all involved
parties, not just those parties who signed the agreement.'
2
10. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
[1971] I.C.J. 16, discussed at note 25 infra.
1I. The canon of statutory interpretation that a statute should be presumed not to con-
flict with an international obligation reflects the policy that arrangements made in compli-
ance with a treaty should not be thwarted unreasonably. See text accompanying note 62 &
notes 62, 65 infra; Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920) (upholding will with
foreign beneficiaries due to treaty allowing foreigners to inherit); The Sophie Rickmers, 45
F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (assumption of tonnage payable in U.S. ports based on treaty
provisions). See generally Edwards, Abrogation of Contracts by War, 44 GROTIUS SOC'Y
TRANSACTIONS 91 (1958).
12. British and West German fishermen relied on their access to fishing grounds in the
waters off Iceland after the conclusion of the 1961 Exchange of Notes between the United
Kingdom and the Icelandic governments. Dependence on these fishing grounds of the
fishermen, processing industries, and the economies of certain British communities contin-
ued. The unilateral claim by Iceland to terminate their rights in those waters on the ground
of changed circumstances threatened the livelihoods of many individuals, who then pressed
their governments not to tolerate Iceland's behavior. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K.
v. Ice.), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (Jurisdiction). The decision in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, which
gave great weight to the priority of the coastal State in the exploitation of fishing resources,
also greatly affected other States not directly involved in the case. Third World nations that
might have considered starting long-range fishing fleets as a relatively inexpensive means to
develop new protein sources now found themselves barred from fishing in productive areas
of the oceans. While Iceland's actions did not directly affect those nations which had yet to
launch their fleets, Iceland did foreclose options formerly available to them, a fact consid-
ered neither by the Icelandic elites nor by the International Couri of Justice.
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Private business associations, banks, and other commercial organiza-
tions make arrangements in direct reliance on international economic
agreements. Actions such as the 1971 United States devaluation of the
dollar13 may thwart their expectations. A major dislocation of con-
tracts will give rise to private claims from individuals as well as public
demands from the elites involved.14 More directly, a crisis may create
demands to alter economic development or concession agreements,
whether the parties are States or a State and a multinational
corporation.'
5
Any worthwhile analysis must balance the protection of private in-
vestment throughpacta sunt servanda with the allowance of necessary
flexibility for the host State.' 6 For example, private agreements relat-
ing to carriage of goods by sea or air, transportation and insurance
costs, and international transit timetables depend on agreements for
rights of passage through international waterways or for air-transit
rights.' 7 A complete analysis must balance private interests in the sta-
bility of such arrangements with the need for flexibility to protect the
security of the State.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. The freezing of Iranian assets by President Carter in November, 1979, despite a rele-
vant bililateral treaty, Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,
1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Amity] caused just such an outcrop of claims, primarily from U.S. banks and businesses that
had relied on continued stability between the two States. The overthrow of the Imperial
government and the institution of new values within Iran were perceived by Iran as
threatened by the United States. The seizure of the American Embassy and the possibility
of an economic crisis within the United States caused by a withdrawal of the assets led to the
freeze to protect U.S. national interests beyond the sum total of the private claims. See
generally Lambert & Coston, Friendy Foes in the Iranian Assets Litigation, 7 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 89 (1980).
15. Many of these economic development agreements incorporateforce majeure clauses
to determine the relations between parties in the event of war. See Delaume, supra note 2, at
248 for examples of such clauses. The trend toward the internationalization of concession
contracts between States and private investors (where the contracts make international law
rather than any particular domestic law applicable) will require developing applicable prin-
ciples of international law. See generally Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California
Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (Caltex Case), Award on the Merits (1977), re-
printed in 17 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1 (1978); Arbitration between Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.
and Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (O.P.I.C.), reprinted in 17 INT.L LEG. MAT.
1321 (1978).
16. A change of government leading to domestic economic reforms ostensibly requiring
nationalization programs may lead to claims from those who had concluded concession
agreements with the previous government. See A. FATOURos, GOvERNMENT GUARANTEES
TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 213-302 (1962); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969). The conflicting doctrines ofpacta sunt servanda (treaties
must be respected) and rebus sic stantibus (changed circumstances) provide little guidance to
a decision-maker evaluating such claims, particularly in a world of often changing
circumstances.
17. See part IV. B. infra for a discussion of international transit agreements.
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C. Options Available
Once faced with a crisis, the parties must select strategies and tactics.
The range of options available is wider than termination, withdrawal,
or suspension. A party may consider a treaty worth upholding despite
the higher costs, among which is the cost of likely counter-demands by
other parties. A party may do nothing, either breaching the agreement
or attempting to maneuver the other side into material breach. The
party may interpret the other parties' actions as breach justifying termi-
nation. Non-performance may spur renegotiation, or parties may try to
sever certain provisions while keeping others in force.
The parties may prescribe for the outcome in the case of unforeseen
or unexpected events threatening the values projected by the agree-
ment.18 Of course, where such provisions exist, the parties should com-
ply with them. Unfortunately, in many cases the imprecise terms do
little more than alert the parties to the possibility of differing obliga-
tions under such circumstances. Often the agreement refers the party
to norms of international law independent of the agreement (a tech-
nique of limited usefulness due to the uncertain nature of the law in
this field).19 Events that can trigger such a clause are usually described
in general terms. Although the phrases used--"war," "beyond the rea-
sonable control of any party," "enemy action" -are objectively framed,
the claimant party normally will decide for itself when the situation
warrants application of the clause.
20
18. Such provisions frequently appear in economic development agreements. See note
15 supra. Agreements concluded between States not uncommonly also contain such clauses.
For example, Article 9 of the Agreement between India and the U.S.S.R., Sept. 28, 1959,
providing for financial assistance to India, states that
If the performance of the present Agreement is interfered with for any length of time by
wars, enemy action, embargoes, blockades or any other cause beyond the control of
either Party, the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of
U.S.S.R. shall immediately consult with each other and co-ordinate measures to be
taken and if such agreement cannot be reached within any acceptable period of time,
the Indian authorities may complete the [development project] in such manner as may
be deemed necessary; but even in that case the rights and liabilities of the parties, aris-
ing under the present Agreement till then shall remain in force.
Reprinted in Delaume, supra note 2, at 249.
19. See Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature Dec.
7, 1944, art. 89, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 296 [hereinafter cited as Chi-
cago Convention] ("In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the
freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as
neutrals.")
20. In rare instances, machinery is available for third-party determinations of the exist-
ence of emergency conditions. The European Court of Human Rights has performed in this





When deciding on the appropriate response to changed circum-
stances, a decision-maker must first recognize and then attempt to bal-
ance the various (and often conflicting) interests at stake. The State
must protect values it regards as essential to its integrity and threatened
by the crisis. Beyond the individual State's interest in defending its
security lie the interests of the international community in minimum
world order and the least necessary disruption to international life.
The first concern of the international community is the containment
of conflict by encouraging a cease-fire, troop withdrawals, and the
opening of negotiations. Containment of the conflict, moreover, con-
notes minimum interference with international trade, commerce, and
communications. This interest in stability andpacta sunt servanda ex-
ceeds the requirements of minimum order; it is the stability necessary
for commercial planning and the maintenance of private expectations
necessary to beneficial economic exchanges.21
These community policies apply without regard to the legality of the
hostilities. While allowing termination or suspension in the event of a
conflict may allow an aggressor to choose those agreements it intends to
honor,22 any other conclusion would subordinate a decision about the
continuing applicability of agreements to a determination of aggres-
sion. Such a determination, realistically, is unlikely, at least until the
conclusion of the hostilities. In the event of a subsequent authoritative
determination of aggression, further claims (for example, for repara-
tions) could then be made.
Third parties who determine that a particular party is an aggressor
may suspend or terminate their agreements with that State to avoid
giving it assistance. Even without a determination of aggression, sus-
pension or termination may help contain the conflict.2 3 An authorita-
tive decision as to aggression by the institutionalized world community
21. This need for stability must be weighed against the need for flexibility; the interna-
tional interests should not demand performance where it no longer conforms to the shared
expectations of the parties. See text accompanying note 29 infra; Lissitzyn, Treaties and
Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967).
22. "It has been rightly suggested, with regard to the abrogation of treaties as the result
of war, that it may be improper for courts to recognize, in a way benefiting the aggressor
State, the automatic termination of treaties in consequence of a war launched by him." 2 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (7th ed. 1952).
23. An example is the cessation of arms supplies by the United Kingdom to all States
involved in the Middle East conflict, regardless of any determination of aggression. The
United Kingdom asserted that it was "inconsistent to call for an immediate end to the fight-
ing and yet to continue to send arms to the conflict." 1973 KEnsIN'S CONTEMPORARY
ARCHIVEs 26235.
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justifies such an action' to a greater degree. 24 Still, interference with
treaty rights should be taken only with respect to those agreements rele-
vant to the specific terms of the sanction.
25
The interests and strategies of the world community can be summa-
rized in four recommendations. First, no deviation from fundamental
human rights policy should be tolerated. Even at times of severe crisis
seriously threatening group values, humanitarian limits must restrict
the options available to national elites. This policy underlies the prin-
ciple ofjus cogens in the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties
("Vienna Convention"). 26 Second, principles of economy and reciproc-
24. A sanction imposed by the Security Council under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter
justifies the suspension of pre-existing agreements with the deviant State. Layton, The Effect
of Measures Short of War on Treaties, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 96 (1962). This action follows
from Article 103 and is intended to force compliance with the norms prescribed by the world
community. More problematic are similar demands made by the General Assembly, which
of course has no compulsory powers. For example, in G.A. Res. 2107, 20 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 14) 62, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), members of the General Assembly urged
States to "refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of
the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal." Com-
pliance with this Resolution would have been inconsistent with the Chicago Convention,
supra note 19. See Letter dated Mar. 30, 1966 from the Secretary-General of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/6294
(1966). A General Assembly Resolution with political motivations should not, in the view of
many scholars, justify the suspension of international agreements.
25. In the Namibia Case, the judges of the I.C.J. expressed different opinions as to the
appropriate behavior of States with respect to agreements made with South Africa. See
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J.
16. The basis for such sanctions rested on the illegality of South Africa's presence in
Namibia. The breach of the Mandate Agreement threatened the basic values (respect for
human dignity and promotion of the well-being of the Mandatory peoples) of the Mandate
system. The world community wished to act to restore those protections to the Namibian
people.
The majority opinion took a comparatively conservative approach; no further treaties
should be concluded with South Africa where that government purports "to act on behalf of
or concerning Namibia." -d. at 55. Nations should not make new or apply existing bilateral
agreements but apparently need not suspend or terminate them; nations should respect mul-
tilateral agreements with humanitarian goals where not to do so would adversely affect the
inhabitants of Namibia.
In a separate opinion, Judge Ammoun was prepared to go much further. He character-
ized South Africa's presence and activities as acts of aggression and open warfare against the
Namibians, not merely as acts of illegality. The world community could only respond to
South Africa's immoral attack against fundamental values by extreme and sweeping meas-
ures. Treaty relationships must yield. "[O]bligations contained in those treaties cannot pre-
vail over the obligation not to assist an aggressor State." Id. at 67, 94. None of the other
judges wholeheartedly supported this radical minority view. Judge Ammoun's statement
remains, however, a clear policy approach for decision-makers where there has been an
unambiguous and authoritative determination of aggression.
26. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27, arts. 53, 64, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Con-
vention]. See also O'Boyle, Emergency Situations and the Protection ofHuman Rights, 28 N.
IRE. LEGAL Q. 160 (1977). On the Vienna Convention generally, see Kearney & Dalton, The
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ity militate against the termination or suspension of agreements with
no direct bearing on the conduct of hostilities.2 7 The unnecessary de-
struction of values increases the cost of handling the crisis for other
parties and most likely will provoke countermeasures. Parties should
also act to cause the least possible destruction of the legitimate expecta-
tions of third parties, whether other elites or private persons, especially
those parties least able to absorb the loss.2 8 Elites must attempt to limit
demands that may prejudice the welfare of individuals, either within
ttlat State or in other States. In all cases, a comprehensive evaluation
the effects of the acceptance of those demands must be made so that
the impact on all global values can be assessed before reaching a
decision.
Third, within these limits, parties should be allowed to deviate from
their international obligations when they perceive that strict adherence
will threaten essential values. While parties should not view claims of
crisis as an easy escape from onerous obligations, some flexibility must
be tolerated. Legitimate changes in expectations, based on verifiably
changed situations, should be upheld. To hold parties to obligations
entered into under different circumstances may cause disrespect for
treaty relationships, foster resentment, discourage States from conclud-
ing international agreements, and make breach the only realistic
option.29
Finally, the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and neces-
sity, as applied to determine the lawfulness of actions allegedly taken in
self-defense, 30 should also act as a limit on States' freedom of action.
An essential element of proportionality is specificity. It requires that
claims relate to the values threatened by the conflict in question and
would classify as unreasonable claims based on agreements that are
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970); U.S. Ratfcation of the Vienna Treaty
Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1979); section III. A. infra.
27. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
42-43 (1961).
28. See Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Treat to International Peace, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974) (1973 Arab oil embargo violated provisions of G.A.T.T. and was
unjustifiable in view of the global dislocation of values it caused).
29. See Lissitzyn, supra note 21. The rule that states cannot plead an internal law to
justify failure to perform an international obligation, see Vienna Convention, supra note 26,
art. 27, must be modified to this extent, especially where performance of the agreement
would be self-destructive.
30. In his famous letter concerning The Caroline incident, Daniel Webster said that force
should be employed in self-defense only when "the necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." Letter
from Secretary of State Webster to Lord Ashburton, Aug. 6, 1842, quoted in 2 J. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
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peripheral to those threatened values. 3' Claims should be evaluated
according to a sliding scale that depends on the extent, duration, and
severity of the threat to the group values. Parties should consult with
other parties before taking unilateral action. Attempting to minimize
the adverse and disruptive consequences means that suspension is pre-
ferred to termination and renegotiation to either.
Decision-makers should consider their strategies with respect to in-
ternational agreements in times of crisis with these criteria in mind. A
principal consideration in the formulation of a party's demands will be
the likely community response to those claims. These criteria will de-
termine the community response, thus making these policies vitally im-
portant elements in initial considerations of strategy.
III. Past Trends in Decision: The Relevant Prescriptions
This section will review and evaluate the law of the effect of crisis on
international agreements, including the Vienna Convention, municipal
court decisions, and the writings of jurists. Traditionally, scholars have
classified the effect of crisis on treaty relationships under one of three
doctrines: impossibility of performance, fundamental change of cir-
cumstances, and the effect of war on agreements. This Article argues
that one should view all three as different responses to changed circum-
stances resulting in a crisis and then assess the adequacy of the re-
sponse in terms of the goals posited.
A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The Vienna Convention, the major source of law in this field, de-
scribes the consequences of termination,32 suspension,33 and allows for
the severability of provisions impossible to perform.3 4 The Convention
and its Annex set out the procedures for making these demands.3 5 The
inclusion of these procedures represented a compromise aimed at
preventing arbitrary, unilateral, or secretive claims so as to achieve a
balance between the rights of the objecting State and those of the
31. W. REisMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 836-58 (1971),
32. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 70.
33. Id., art. 72. See also Petition of Nederlandsche Rijnvaart-Vereeniging, District
Court of Rotterdam, [1958] N.L 473, reprintedin 24 INT'L L. REp. 99 (1957).
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 44. Demands for withdrawal from a bilateral
agreement amount to demands for termination. In contrast, withdrawal from a multilateral
convention will leave the agreement in force between all the other parties, with the claimant
State no longer bound by its provisions. See id., arts. 54-57. The analysis in this Article
applies to both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Given the multiplicity of factors to be
considered, however, analysis of a multilateral treaty could be more complex.




claimant State.36 Unfortunately, the procedures do little more than re-
iterate the pre-existing obligation to settle disputes peacefully. 37 The
claimant State must allow the other parties time for their reply so that
the latter are not pressured into a premature response. This delay,
however, is not required in times of "special urgency," which would
probably include most crises. Indeed, the Vienna Convention specifi-
cally excludes from its coverage the effect of war on treaty
relationships. 38
Article 61 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with impossibility of
performance, allows for termination, suspension, or withdrawal from
an agreement when an object indispensible to performance has been
destroyed or lost. An essentially pragmatic provision with little policy
basis, Article 61 legitimates the simple proposition that no purpose is
served by demanding impossible performance. Its application is ex-
tremely limited. A strict interpretation would apply the provision to
natural disasters but only in exceptional cases to conflicts between the
parties.39 In the latter instance, the changed relationship between the
parties, not the destruction of some vital object, usually would precipi-
tate the claim.4°
Article 62, on fundamental changes in circumstances, represents a
compromise between opposing positions at Vienna.41 The language
adopted provides for terminating or suspending international obliga-
36. See Nahlik, The Grounds ofInvalidity and Tennination of Treaties, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
736 (1971) (discussing views of U.S. and Austrian representatives at conference that drafted
Vienna Convention).
37. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(3). See note 44 infra.
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 73.
39. Article 61(1) reads:
A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for termi-
nating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappear-
ance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the
impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the oper-
ation of the treaty.
Id, art. 61(1). The limited scope of the article is illustrated by the examples given by the
International Law Commission (I.L.C.), such as a river drying up or changing its course.
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records 75-76, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/
I I/Add. 2 (1971).
40. Article 61 might occasionally be relevant to the effects of conflict on treaties. For
example, the destruction of an oil field during a war could lead to Article 61 claims to excuse
failure to supply oil. However, Article 61(2) disallows the impossibility defense where the
impossibility is the "result of a breach by that party. . . of any other international obliga-
tion." If the State whose oil field was destroyed was itself an aggressor and in breach of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, this defense would not be available to it.
41. There was anxiety that its inclusion would justify unilateral withdrawal from agree-
ments and undermine the stability of treaty regimes. On the other hand, the newly in-
dependent States may have seen the article as a means lawfully to avoid onerous or
unprofitable commitments that changed circumstances had made intolerably lurdensome.
See [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 256-60, U.N. Doe. ,A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add. 1.
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tions because of changed circumstances, but its wording is restrictive
and phrased in the negative.42 Because the original situation must have
formed an essential basis for the commitment, lawyers often must spec-
ulate as to which combination of factors was instrumental in persuad-
ing a party to conclude an agreement.
The Vienna Convention does not prescribe the effect of war on
agreements; Article 73 is instead a compromise provision that resolves
nothing.43 Its inclusion does support the view that neither the States at
Vienna nor the International Law Commission considered Articles 61
and 62 sufficient to cover this problem, leaving the need for a contem-
porary reappraisal.44
42. Article 62 reads:
Fundamental change of circumstances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty
unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for termi-
nating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it
either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation
owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also
invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 62.
43. "The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may
arise in regard to a treaty. .. from the outbreak of hostilities between States." Id., art. 73.
44. A number of States voiced concern about the lack of any provision covering the
effect of war on agreements. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C./L. 279 (1969), refprintedin
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records 199, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1 1/
Add.2 (1971); Nahlik, supra note 36, at 753. The International Law Commission concluded
that the effect of hostilities on agreements could not be stated without a separate analysis of
Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, an analysis it could not conveniently deal with "in the
context of its present work upon the law of treaties." [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 176-77,
U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.l. With all due respect, the I.L.C. simply avoided a
problem of increasing practical importance by stating that the U.N. Charter made the matter
more complex.
Nonetheless, the obligation of the peaceful settlement of disputes exists independently of
the Vienna Convention, see U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(3). In addition, Article 73, while specifi-
cally reserving the issue of the effect of war on treaties, may nonetheless allow such a claim
to be within the Convention for the purposes of Article 62. On policy grounds, arbitrary
claims should not be encouraged at a time of crisis, as these might exacerbate already tense
situations. The procedures in the Vienna Convention may provide a means to limit such
claims. Within these limits, claimants should be entitled to make demands regarding agree-
ments whether or not these possible strategies are explicitly included as permissible within a
particular agreement.
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International legal authority available to the drafters of the Vienna
Convention similarly is inadequate to deal fully with the effects of hos-
tilities. Years before the formulation of Article 62, the Permanent
Court emphasized the difference between wartime conditions in gen-
eral and those conditions necessary to transform the burdens required
by an agreement.45 The existence of war, by itself, does not meet the
rigorous requirements of Article 62.46 Nonetheless, depending on the
severity and intensity of the conflict, war can represent a fundamental
change of circumstances, even for a neutral State. Larger community
values, as well as national interests, may weigh in favor of modifica-
tion. For example, one of the most widely-discussed incidents of such a
modification was the United States' decision to suspend the Load Line
Convention in 1941, long before the Vienna Convention was drafted.47
Even though the United States was still a neutral, the suspension can be
justified under the policies suggested above. Through widespread and
intense warfare, one power had seized control of most of Europe. The
fall of Britain would have threatened American group values. The
President's response was limited to the issue at hand, was directly
caused by the changed conditions, appeared proportional to the intense
crisis, and was arguably necessary for British survival. The United
States secured the cooperation of a number of other parties to the Con-
vention who also became involved in its suspension. Moreover, the
45. In response to claims arising out of World War I, the Court stated that:
[it cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave economic consequences,
affected the legal obligations of the contracts between the Serbian Government and the
French bond holders. The economic dislocations caused by the war did not release the
debtor State, although they may present equities which doubtless will receive appropri-
ate consideration in the negotiations ...
Serbian Loans, [1929] P.C.I.J. Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 39-40.
46. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), [1973] I.C.J. 4, 22 the Court empha-
sized the "radical transformation" necessary to demonstrate changed circumstances. "The
change must have increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of
rendering the performance something essentially different from that originally undertaken."
47. In 1941, just prior to the United States entry into World War II, President Roosevelt
announced that the U.S. would suspend the application of the International Load Line Con-
vention, signed July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228, T.S. No. 858, 135 L.N.T.S. 301, for the duration
of the "present emergency", in order to increase the tonnage of goods crossing the Atlantic
for British use. See 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 186-90 (1968); 14 id.
at 483-85 (1970). Attorney General Biddle justified the suspension on the grounds of rebus
sicstantibus, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 119 (1949), a justification which received criticism. See, e.g.,
Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1942). If
judged against the criterion of Article 62, the criticism appears appropriate. The parties
intended the Loan Line Convention to regulate shipping and commerce. The wartime con-
ditions did not in themselves change the extent of American obligations under the Conven-
tion; it was neither more difficult nor more expensive for the United States to comply. Since
all that had been transformed was the desire of the United States to comply with the restric-
tions imposed by the Convention, this case illustrates the inadequacy of the subsequently
drafted Article 62 for dealing with all the effects of war on agreements.
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United States announced its willingness to comply once again with the
Convention after the conclusion of the war. Finally, many community
policies much more fundamental than the values embodied in the Load
Line Convention militated in favor of aiding the British in their battle
against Nazi Germany. The suspension did compromise the neutrality
of the United States as well as suspend an otherwise valid multilateral
treaty commitment. Yet the human rights policies served by the sus-
pension seem much more powerful than either of those objections.
48
B. HistoricalApproaches to the Effect of Hostilities
In light of the lack of guidance by the Vienna Convention, it is nec-
essary to examine the historical development of the law of the effect of
war on agreements and then to consider how it applies in the world of
the U.N. Charter. Despite voluminous writings on this topic, confusion
remains. Since there is no international decision directly on point, ex-
cessive emphasis has been placed on dicta made in other contexts.
There is surprisingly little conclusive State practice, nor has much juris-
prudential attention been focused on the subject.
49
Most of the available authority derives from municipal court deci-
sions determining the internal effect of war on treaty relationships.
While municipal law normally constitutes good evidence of State prac-
tice, some major problems prevent reliance on these cases. First, the
courts of different States have expressed a considerable diversity of
opinion; jurists have found it difficult to derive one accepted view.50
Second, the municipal court may give excessive weight to current poli-
cies of its executive.51 Third, municipal courts often will be greatly in-
fluenced by a desire to protect private, vested rights, the context in
48. See Rank, Modern War and the Validity of Treaties: A Comparative Study (pts. 1-2),
38 CORN. L.Q. 321, 511 (1953).
49. See I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2d ed. 1949).
Schwarzenberger asserted that the reason for this lack of attention was clear. "[i]f belliger-
ents attach any importance to treaties concluded before the outbreak of a war between them,
the peace treaty offers ample opportunity to settle the matter beyond doubt. .. ." This
analysis has little utility today, since there is often no formal declaration of or conclusion to
an outbreak bf hostilities and consequently no peace treaty. See note 8 supra.
50. See generally Rank, supra note 48, at 511-20.
51. See, e.g, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,513 (1947); Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S.
231, 238 (1929); Soe'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 464, 494 (1823). In Karnuth, the Court decided that the Jay Treaty of 1794 had
been abrogated by the War of 1812. Some Indians claimed that they had been granted the
right of free passage and repassage across the U.S.-Canadian border by the Treaty. The
Court paid great deference to the executive's immigration policy at the time of the case.
That policy surely also influenced the Court in deciding that the Treaty was abrogated and




which most of these cases arise.52
Originally, in both municipal decisions and the writings of jurists,
war was thought to be incompatible with the existence of normal rela-
tions between States so that an outbreak of war automatically abro-
gated all agreements. 53 Such a rule at least had the advantage of
certainty. Yet it disregarded the needs of the global community be-
cause a war could disrupt the totality of normal intercourse between
States. Whole areas of international affairs formerly controlled by
agreements could become deregulated for the duration of a conflict,
with only the hope for renegotiation afterwards. This regime would
cause the defeat or confusion of legitimate expectations in fields totally
unrelated to the arena of conflict.
In place of the traditional rule grew the view that only certain trea-
ties should be considered terminated, while others should be sus-
pended, and still others should continue in force throughout the crisis.
Those activities peripheral to the conduct of the war should continue as
usual. The rejection of the blanket abrogation rule made some sort of
classification process necessary. While parties could, of course, decide
on an ad hoc basis, three general guiding principles emerged. Some
writers considered the relationship of the agreement to the causes of
war to be the decisive factor.54 Others argued that the intention of the
parties, stated explicitly or implicitly, should prevail.5 5 The major
practical difficulty with this second solution is the frequent impossibil-
ity of accurately determining the parties' intentions, even assuming
them ever to have been formulated.5 6 Finally, other jurists developed
formal classifications of agreements according to their nature or pur-
52. Decision-makers in municipal arenas, however, are those most likely to be aware of
the dislocation caused individuals through the frustration of expectations resting on an inter-
national agreement. In these instances, their opinions can constitute good international
authority.
53. See H. TOBIN, THE TERMINATION OF MULTIPARTITE TREAnxrs 13-125 (1933); A.
McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATiES 693-728 (2d ed. 1961); and de La Pradelle, The Effect of
War on Private Law Treaties, 2 INT'L L.Q. 555 (1948) for historical discussions of both mu-
nicipal law decisions and the writings of jurists on this point.
54. H. TOBIN, supra note 53, at 27, quotes Lawrence and Westlake as holding this view.
55. Hurst, The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BrT. Y. B. INT'L L. 37' (1921). See also
Rank, supra note 48.
56. The parties may not have envisaged an outbreak of hostilities between them (or may
not wish to admit to having considered this eventuality) so that their intentions will have to
be inferred from surrounding circumstances such as the wording of the agreement and the
actions of all branches of the government. These branches may themselves give out conflict-
ing signals depending on their various perspectives. Another crucial point is the relevant
time for determining the parties' intentions. If the commencement of hostilities is preferred
to the conclusion of the agreement, there is the additional complicating factor that denuncia-
tion of treaties is itself a coercive strategy, the timing of which may be significant. Rank,
supra note 48, at 335-36, argues that war or confict of itself cannot destroy a legal order or
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pose. The appropriate consequence of termination, suspension, or con-
tinuation depended on the category. 57 This solution made little
allowance for the many agreements that prescribe for a variety of top-
ics. Since an agreement may involve a continuing relationship between
the parties, with a constant chain of action, reaction, and exchange of
values, it is problematic to assert one characteristic as the dominant
object of the agreement.
In this century, two attempts have been made to codify the principles
governing the effect of war on treaty relationships. Ironically, each one
occurred shortly before the outbreak of a major war. The first was in
1912, by the Institute of International Law.5 8 The analysis stated as its
first principle that war does not affect treaty relationships between the
protagonists. Yet, a number of agreements to which this rule does not
apply are subsequently listed. In effect, the Institute adopted the classi-
fication method. Contemporary evaluation found these provisions to
offer some guidance but concluded that there was still too much uncer-
tainty for the rules to become widely accepted. 59
The second attempt was part of the Harvard Research on the Law of
Treaties, which used another technique.60 The authors provided no
overall scheme for determining the effects of war on different types of
agreement; instead they proposed two criteria against which to measure
all treaties in addition to giving significant weight to the intention of
the parties.6' The Harvard Research drew on judgments by American
courts, principally the case of Techt v. Hughes..62 The standard adopted
relationship created by agreements. Instead, the intention of the parties that the agreement
cannot survive this altered state of affairs causes the discontinuance of the commitment.
57. A. McNAiR, supra note 53, gives such a categorization of different types of
agreements.
58. Effects of War Upon Treaties ind International Conventions, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 149
(1912).
59. Davis, Yhe Effects of War Upon International Conventions and Private Contracts, 6
PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 124 (1912).
60. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp.
973 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]..
61. Id., commentary to Article 35, at 1183-1204.
62. 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920). In that case, then-Judge Cardozo formulated a
pragmatic test resting on the compatibility of the specific treaty provision with the safety of
the nation during the emergency caused by the war. He concluded that where there would
be little or no interference with the executive policy concerning the conduct of the war, he
could see no reason against continuing to give effect to the treaty. He thus favored stability
of treaty regimes except where they impeded the President's handling of the crisis. The
authors of the Harvard Research highlighted the lack of any clear analytical principles to be
drawn from municipal law decisions. Cardozo acknowledged that a judge looks in vain
either for "uniformity of doctrine or for scientific accuracy of exposition." He concluded
that the judge must decide in "keeping with the traditions of the law, the policy of the
statutes, the dictates of fair dealing and the honor of the nation," 229 N.Y. at 247, a list of




has the advantage of considering the issue from a policy standpoint,
although it gives excessive weight to national at the expense of global
interests. It avoids the rigidities of artificial categorization and of reli-
ance on mythical intentions of the parties.
There has been little further development of this subject since the
end of World War II despite the outbreaks of hostilities causing threats
to group values.6 3 Academic analysis of the subsequent Peace Treaties
was generally limited to the peculiar nature of those agreements.64
Subsequent municipal decisions also are of limited usefulness for for-
mulating generalized principles of international law.6 5 This subject re-
mains confused; O'Connell described it as an "obscure topic with only
particular municipal law decisions to derive general principles of applicable international
law (see text accompanying notes 50-52 supra), it can be seen that reliance on them does not
resolve the issue.
63. The notable exception is Rank, supra note 48, who sets forth an excellent compara-
tive survey of the municipal case law of a number of countries, as well as a more general
discussion. See also Institute of International Law, Fifth Commission, The Effects ofArmed
Conflicts on Treaties, Provisional Report and Proposed Draft Resolution (1976) (on file with
The Yale Journal of World Public Order) [hereinafter cited as The Effects oArmed Conflicts
on Treaties]. The Report will be presented in a forthcoming YEARBOOK of the Institute. See
note 111 infra for a fuller description of its contents.
64. Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties, [1948] 2 HAGUE RECUEIL
259. See S. McINTYRE, LEGAL EFFECT OF WORLD WAR II ON TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES (1958) for a detailed empirical study of the effects of World War II on treaties en-
tered into by the U.S. prior to the war.
65. E.g., Brownell v. City and County, 126 Cal. App. 2d 102, 271 P.2d 974 (1954) (treaty
on tax exemption unaffected by World War II); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.
1957) (extradition treaty with Italy suspended by World War II); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503 (1947) (Treaty of 1923 between Germany and the United States regulating reciprocal
inheritance rights unaffected by World War II in absence of evidence that the political
branches deemed Germany incapable of fulfilling its treaty obligations); In re Dirk's Appli-
cations for Patent, [1960] Pat. Cas. 1 (International Patent Convention deemed suspended
between U.K. and Germany for duration of World War II); Petition of Nederlandsche
Rijnvaart-Vereeniging, District Court of Rotterdam, [1958] N.J. 473, reprinted/n 24 INT'L L.
REP. 99 (1957) (Rhine Convention suspended in practice but not in law by outbreak of
World War II). While all these cases concern the effect of World War II on agreements, no
consistency has developed. Moreover, cases concerning other subsequent conflicts appear to
be extremely rare.
Little conceptual attention has been paid, in particular, to the difference between suspen-
sion and termination. Most decisions have instead rested on the facts of the case and the
perceived desirable result. For example, in Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929), a
decision of suspension would have made the government's current immigration policy inef-
fective; therefore a determination of termination was preferred. In the Nederlandsche
Rijnvaart-Vereeniging case, the relevant governments had resumed giving full effect to the
Rhine Convention so it was sensible to the court to say that the Convention had only been
suspended by the War. Other courts seem to have-followed the classification method, sej
text accompanying note 57 and note 57 supra, as when they hold that extradition treaties f
into the class of treaties deemed suspended by war. In general, courts have favored a prag-
matic approach, based on the exigencies of war, noninterference with executive policy, and a
desire not to upset private rights and expectations. The incompatibility test propounded by
Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y.,222 (1920), was also used twenty-five years later in
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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the vaguest guiding principles. 66
IV. Recent Claims Relating to Agreements During Conflicts
The analytic model developed in part I and the principles of decision
described in part II can best be understood by applying them to several
recent examples of claims relating to agreements during confficts.
Claims relating to international communications agreements present in
dramatic fashion the tensions created by conflicting interests and value
choices. Communications are essential to the diplomacy and security
of any individual State and to its conduct of policy, including hostili-
ties. In an interdependent world, the effective functioning of normal
international commerce depends on the continued availability of free
and open communication between States. The examples selected show
the often glaring conffict between national policies and community val-
ues. Countries often seek to modify these agreements to serve pressing
short-term needs. The systems of international communications be-
tween national elites, however, serve the long-range interests of all
States. The tension created between these two sets of interests means
that criteria of evaluation are of great practical importance.
A. Dollomatic Immunity: The Iranian Hostages Incident
The seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the forced
detention of its personnel presented the International Court of Justice
with an opportunity to provide guidance on claims relating to the per-
formance of an international agreement in times of undeclared hostili-
ties.67 On one side of the dispute, the United States had an immediate
interest in the liberation of its people and property coupled with the
more significant global interest in the free and uninhibited intercourse
between elites through long-established mechanisms protected by the
provisions of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Re-
lations.6 8 The United States demanded the performance of Iran's obli-
gations under those Conventions and reparations for their breach. On
the other side, Iran claimed the Embassy seizure helped protect its rev-
olutionary values from intervention by other States. An internal
change in situation (here, the overthrow of the Imperial Government in
66. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1965).
67. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United
States v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. 4.
68. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
See also Treaty of Amity, supra note 14.
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early 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic) had brought
to crisis the relations between the United States and Iran. Each nation
wanted to protect its respective values. Iran urged that its claims
against the United States justified the actions taken; that this extraordi-
nary change in circumstances warranted the failure to abide by the Vi-
enna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. The
Iranians considered their actions necessary, as they had no other means
of securing redress against the United States for past wrongs, and rea-
sonable, because they were directed primarily at the Embassy, the focal
point for the alleged earlier misdeeds. The Iranians did not announce a
suspension of the Conventions; indeed, they demanded its implementa-
tion against a State towards which they felt only a little less hostile than
toward the United States.69 The Iranian claim was that the protection
of other values justified isolated treaty breaches.
The decision of the Court resoundingly affirmed the global impor-
tance of the protection of diplomats and of diplomatic communications
for the maintenance of a minimum public order. It appears from this
unanimous decision that no degree of crisis between the States and no
threat to internal group values would support derogation from the per-
formance of these agreements. Even if an embassy carries out subver-
sive activities that threaten the internal security of the host nation, the
host nation must still respect the Conventions. In powerful language,
the Court asserted that war between the parties would not have altered
its conclusion.70 Iran made extraordinary demands and took arbitrary
69. In May, 1980, the Iranians demanded that the United Kingdom restore their Em-
bassy in London to them after it had been taken over by gunmen. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1980,
at 1, col. 1; Id., May 3, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
70. "Even in the case of armed conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations
those provisions require that both the inviolability of the members of a diplomatic mission
and of the premises ... must be respected by the receiving State." [1980] I.C.J. at 41. Even
if the United States and Iran had broken diplomatic relations prior to the take-over of the
Embassy, that action, of itself, would not have affected the treaty relationships. "The sever-
ance of diplomatic or consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal
relations established between them by the treaty except in so far as the existence of diplo-
matic or consular relations is indispensable for the application of the treaty." Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 26, art. 63.
Additionally, state practice supports the policy of the Convention. An obvious example is
the continuation of the agreement for the maintenance of Guathnamo Naval Base despite
the severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. Lease of Lands
for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16, 1903, United States-Cuba, 31 Stat. 898, T.S. No.
418.
Elites regularly break diplomatic relations with other elites. Some severances represent
serious changes in situation, while others result from trivial incidents that should not create
widespread legal consequences. Even armed conflict might not lead to the breaking of dip-
lomatic relations where the parties deem their maintenance beneficial. India and Pakistan
severed diplomatic relations for the first time in 1971 despite a major outbreak of hostilities
in 1965. Not every break in relations should undermine legitimate expectations arising from
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actions contrary to the purposes of the U.N. Charter without availing
itself of prescribed remedies, which the Vienna Conventions on Diplo-
matic and Consular Relations provide,71 and without prior direct warn-
ing. These actions could not be said to be necessary or reasonable
methods for protecting the perceived values, especially in the face of
available alternatives.
72
B. International Transport Agreements
Demands relating to international transport agreements provide fur-
ther examples of the conflicting, tensions produced by an outbreak of
hostilities on the performance of agreements. States and individuals
have legitimate expectations of free and convenient shipping and air
routes for international trade and commerce and travel needs. These
expectations often conflict with the claims of the transit States for pro-
tecting security and integrity through closure or the imposition of
transit conditions. Unlike diplomatic relations between States, restric-
tions on any given route do not threaten the entire structure of inter-
state communications. If acceptable alternative routes exist, the
demands of the transit States are more likely to be deemed reasonable.
The pragmatic (and probably inevitable) solution initially reached
for sea and air landing facilities made them part of the State's territory.
Despite any previous agreement,73 States regularly close transit to ships
or aircraft of a hostile State. Generally, no State tolerates such an inva-
sion of its territory and corresponding threat to its security under such
circumstances. The situation is less clear where the conflict does not
directly involve the States in question-action taken either to retaliate
an international agreement. Those incidents that result from serious crisis conditions should
be treated in accordance with the policies in part II supra, while less serious incidents should
not be allowed to disrupt global values. Diplomatic relations rarely form the basis of an
agreement and normally are not an essential prerequisite for performance. Elites will con-
tinue to use diplomatic relations as a manipulative political instrument; legal repercussions
need not accompany this strategic instrument.
71. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 45. Such
remedies include declaring one or more diplomatspersona non grata, breaking of relations,
and closure of diplomatic or consular establishments.
72. But see Falk, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy 4nswers and Hard Questions, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 411 (1980) (I.C.J. excessively protective of the values asserted by U.S. and dismis-
sive of those claimed by Iran).
73. Access to ports is generally governed by bilateral agreements. See Declaration of
Paris Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Parry's T.S. 2. In the Aramco Arbitra-
tion, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), Award of Aug. 23, 1958,
at 108-09, reprintedin 27 INT'L L. REP. 117, 212 (1958), the Tribunal stated that "the ports of
every State must be opened to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the
vital interests of the State so require" (footnote omitted).
Vol. 7:177, 1981
Crisis and Performance
for support to the "wrong" side in an external crisis or to demonstrate
sympathy for a specific cause.
It is doubtful whether support for an external crisis can justify sus-
pending treaty rights. Such action is not specific to the conduct of the
conflict and therefore seems unnecessary. Elites enter into agreements
on landing rights for aircraft precisely because such agreements pro-
vide reciprocal benefits to all parties as well as aid the orderly function-
ing of the world community.
L Closure ofAirports in the Middle East and the Cuban Quarantine
Various Arab States closed their air and sea ports to United States
and United Kingdom vessels as a consequence of the 1967 Middle East
War.74 These closures could not be justified on grounds of military
necessity (except perhaps in the cases of Egypt and Syria) and appeared
to be retaliatory action intended to force the withdrawal of support for
Israel. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had com-
mitted a prior illegal act against the Arab nations; therefore, retaliation
could not be justified. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits acts of
coercive retaliation. While suspending the term of an agreement does
not require any use of armed force, it may be coercive in its effect and
therefore contrary to the purposes of the Charter.
75
The actions of Senegal, Guinea, and Canada in October, 1962 pro-
vide an interesting contrast. To make effective the "defensive quaran-
tine" of Cuba, the United States requested that the three nations refuse
74. Syria refused overflight rights and closed Damascus airport to U.S. and U.K. air-
craft. Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt acted likewise. 1967 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES
22135.
75. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), Principle I: "States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."
It could be argued that the suspensions, given the extremely tense situation of the 1967
war, were justified as collective self-defense by members of the Arab League. In addition to
Egypt and Syria, both Iraq and the Sudan declared war on Israel. The limited nature and
duration of the suspensions, along with the availability of alternative air routes and ports,
meant no permanent dislocation of expectations. Moreover, the special character of an air-
port, located deep within a State's territory, might add to the reasonableness argument.
However, the need for collective self-defense, see U.N. CHARTER, arts. 52-54, does not by
itself make more reasonable or necessary the suspension of agreements with third parties.
Members of the Arab League view the very existence of Israel as an act of aggression
justifying the collective right of self-defense. In this light, they could view the-support of the
United States and United Kingdom for Israel as an attack on the Arab States justifying the
suspensions. Only under this interpretation could the Arab States postulate a threat in the
absence of direct actions by the Western powers giving rise to the right of self-defense.
See also Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl G.m.b.H., [1962] A.C. 93 (seller held to
shipping contract despite closure of Suez Canal).
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landing rights to Soviet aircraft bound for Havana. The immediate dis-
pute between the United States and the Soviet Union did not directly
threaten the group values of these States, unless the build-up of missiles
would have so altered the world strategic balance as to create a global
crisis. The Cuban quarantine seems more reasonable, proportionate,
and directly related to the crisis, however, than the Arab flight ban.
76
The comparison between these two examples underlines the need for
contextual analysis of the changed situations, in particular the relation
of the demands made concerning the agreement to the crisis.
77
2. The Greek-Turkish Dispute
The conflict between Greece and Turkey, involving the suspension of
overflight rights as well as of landing rights, provides another illustra-
tion of these types of claims. Tension mounted between Greece and
Turkey during the 1970's, primarily as a result of the Turkish invasion
of Cyprus in July, 1974 and the continuing dispute over the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Both sides placed their
armed forces on alert and the incidents led to the suspension of air
76. The United States undertook the quarantine of Cuba with the support of a regional
organization; the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) voted unaminously to support
the United States. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 723 (1962); see also note 5 infra. Superficially, the
actions of States not members of the relevant regional organization may seem less justified
than the Arab States' refusal of landing rights, note 75 supra. However, the ban on Soviet
aircraft was more restricted, limited to only those en route to Cuba. Second, the ban was
enforced against the State precipitating the changed situation creating the crisis, not less-
involved third States. If the Cuban quarantine was legal under Article 51 or 53 of the U.N.
Charter, then other States' assistance in the collective self-defense of the Western Hemi-
sphere was also legal. Third, the specific ban here was necessary and proportionate; the
effectiveness of the embargo strategy depended on limiting air traffic to Cuba. Finally, the
ban on Soviet overflights was lifted as soon as was possible. See Akehurst, Enforcement
Action By RegionalA gencies with Speclal Reference to the 0.4.S., 42 BRAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175,
197-203 (1967); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. L INT'L L. 515 (1963).
For a more general defense of the legitimacy of the Cuban quarantine, see A. CHAYES,
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1974); Mc-
Dougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963). Con-
tra Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
77. Professor Cheng acknowledged the ease with which States can suspend or terminate
air space agreements, especially bilateral ones. Cheng admits that the present regime causes
unavoidable uncertainty and the disruption of legitimate expectations but considers these
drawbacks an inevitable concommitant to crisis. B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT 113-15, 483-84 (1962).
However, as the global needs for ever more reliable air routes grow, such interference is
likely to become less acceptable. Possibly a higher standard of proof will be imposed upon
States claiming that suspension of landing or overflight rights is a reasonable and necessary
response to a crisis. See Lauterpacht, Freedom of Transit in International Law, 44 GRoTIUs
Soc'y TRANSAcTIONs 313, 351 (1958) (while there is at present no international right of air
transit, partly for eco4omic and partly for security reasons, it may develop because "freedom
of transit is one of tme most fundamental needs of the community").
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After the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey declared parts of the Aegean
Sea "dangerous zones" for all air traffic. Later, Turkey demanded con-
trol of all flights to and from Turkey to "the middle of the Aegean,"
causing considerable interference with flights over Greek islands. In
1976 Greece banned flights over maritime areas that it perceived as the
boundaries between Greece and Turkey, thus disrupting air traffic be-
tween Athens and Istanbul. After negotiations, the two States reached
an agreement allowing resumption of normal air traffic in September,
1976.
In neither case was there actual armed conflict between Greece and
Turkey, although such a possibility clearly existed. Neither of these
suspensions was a necessary part of any military action, nor essential to
security, and both sets of demands were peripheral to the main dis-
putes. Neither country's actions appear to be supportable. Turkey sus-
pended the air rights to assist in making effective her occupation of
Cyprus. The failure of any member of the world community to recog-
nize the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus79 underlines the global dis-
approval of this creation. Claims made in its furtherance also should
be rejected.80 On the other hand, Greece acted to further its territorial
claims, which the Turkish representative at the United Nations charac-
terized as an attempt to turn almost all of the international air space of
the Aegean into internal air space.' Greece presented her demands
before such authoritative international arenas as the Security Council
and the International Court,8 2 and also indicated its readiness to nego-
tiate. Both actions suggested reasonarleness. Nevertheless, unilateral
suspensions of air flight agreements cannot be accepted as a means of
pressing a territorial claim. Alternative methods are available to which
resort should be made.
78. See 1976 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 27987 and references cited therein
for a summary of these events.
79. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed over the portion of the is-
land under Turkish control in February, 1975. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
80. Greece argued that the Turkish invasion was illegal under Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. Turkey, in turn, claimed that its actions were justified and even demanded by the
Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, [1961] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 5 (Cmd. 1253), 382 U.N.T.S. 3.
Negotiations between the interested parties have not resolved the situation. The lack of
recognition for the Turkish Federated State may suggest lack of sympathy for Turkey's
claims. See generally [1974] U.N.Y.B. 262-96; [1975] U.N.Y.B. 273-96.
81. Letters dated Apr. 8, 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1975)
7-8, U.N. Docs. S/11666 & S/11668 (1975). See generalo [1975] U.N.Y.B. 320-22.
82. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 4 (Request for
Interim Measures). This interim judgment of the I.C.J. has clearly not settled the dispute
between Greece and Turkey, which continues to the present day.
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3. The India-Pakistan Oveiytight Dispute
In 1971, Pakistan claimed before the Council of the International
Civil-Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.) that its aircraft had rights both
to fly over India and to stop in India for nontraffic purposes. Pakistan
based its claim on two multilateral aviation conventions and a bilateral
treaty.8 3 India responded to the treaty claim by alleging that these
agreements had been suspended by the outbreak of military hostilities
in 1965.84 India used a "serial war" argument: the continuing abnor-
mal relations between the two States since 1947, with frequent spas-
modic outbreaks of overt conflict, had prevented the agreements from
reviving. India asserted that Pakistan could have had no legitimate ex-
pectations of continuing rights of air passage when further conflict
could not have been unanticipated. Because suspending these rights
did not defeat any reasonably held expectations of Pakistan, India's
action was a reasonable response to this latest episode of violence. In-
dia claimed that the only relevant agreement was the special agreement
of 1966, which required specific permission for overflight.8 5
Pakistan then claimed that India had not actually suspended the
agreements or, in the alternative that, as an aggressor, it could not law-
fully do S0.86 The Chicago Convention has a provision on the effect of
war on the obligations of parties and allows freedom of action in case
of war or national emergency.87 States may suspend the agreements
83. Pakistan demanded performance of two multilateral conventions: the Chicago Con-
vention, supra note 19, and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944,
59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487, 84 U.N.T.S. 389, as well as the bilateral Agreement Relating
to Air Services, June 23, 1948, India-Pakistan, 28 U.N.T.S. 143. For a full account of the
proceedings before the I.C.A.O., see Memorial of India, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction
of the I.C.A.O. Council, I.C.J. Pleadings 63-293 (1973).
84. India stated that the hostilities and a 1971 hijacking incident had placed on it "heavy
burdens' with regard to its security and to the safety of aircraft. Letter dated Feb. 10, 1971
from the Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation of India to the President of the I.C.A.O.,
reprintedin Memorial of India, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the I.C.A.O. Council,
I.C.J. Pleadings 297-98 (1973).
85. This agreement was concluded after the termination of the 1965 hostilities. India
argued that Pakistan's entry into that agreement was further proof that the latter had ac-
cepted the continuing suspension of the earlier agreements. By agreeing to seek special per-
mission to exercise the "right" of overflight, Pakistan could have no reasonable expectation
of the permanency of that right. Cf. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, [1960] I.C.J. 6
(if permission required for transit, right is not an enforceable servitude).
86. The relevance of a determination of aggression to claims relating to agreements
again appears dubious, as India in turn inevitably presented Pakistan as the aggressor. With
respect to the suspension of a bilateral agreement, it seems even more artificial to make the
solution rest on an authoritative determination of aggression that is unlikely to be forthcom-
ing. Note that although the Chicago Convention, supra note 19, is multilateral, it is bilateral
in its effect between any two contracting parties.
87. Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art. 89. That Convention provided the basis of
the I.C.A.O.'s jurisdiction, the issue presented to the I.C.J. See note 83 supra. India claimed
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when conflict threatens their security. The military hostilities of 1965,
although limited both in purpose and arenas, were intense and severe.
It would be disruptive and possibly even destructive to a State to insist
that it must allow the enemy to fly over and land in its territory. a8 It
can be argued that this suspension was necessary to protect India's val-
ues, reasonable in that it affected primarily the protagonist, Pakistan,
proportional to the intense nature of the conflict, and probably not un-
anticipated by Pakistan in the light of the history between the two
States. Though the suspension of transit rights seemed of excessively
long duration (six years), perhaps the "serial war" nature of the con-
fficts made the duration reasonable. While Pakistan did suffer consid-
erable economic loss and severe inconvenience,8 9 the existence of
alternative routes, even though expensive and much less direct, did
make India's action more reasonable.90
To insist on rigid adherence to transport conventions without al-
that this provision, read in connection with Article 73 of the Vienna Convention, meant that
principles of law independent of the Chicago Convention should govern. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 26, art. 73. See also note 43 supra.
The provisions made for national emergencies within the Chicago Convention indicate
that the parties anticipated such steps and considered them legitimate. In situations of con-
ffict with another State, States notify the Council of the I.C.A.O. The I.C.A.O. makes no
independent judgment on these claims but does release information on them to other con-
tracting parties, a response that does in part uphold their validity. Such a regime supports
the view that determinations of aggression should be separate from the assessment of the
appropriateness of demands relating to agreements. The only subjective assessment the
I.C.A.O. does make is whether a state of emergency has been formally declared, not of the
grounds for doing so. See T. BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION (1969).
An interesting contrast lies with a State's declaration of "prohibited areas" under the Chi-
cago Convention for "national security reasons." Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art. 9.
In April, 1967, Spain prohibited all foreign aircraft, both civil and military, from flying
within specified areas around Gibraltar. Britain protested to the I.C.A.O. Council that
Spain's action was unreasonable and coercive since it was intended to cut off Gibraltar from
outside contacts. The Council refused to take sides in the dispute. 1967 KEEsING'S CON-
TEMPORARY ARCHIVES 22039; T. BUERGENTHAL, supra, at 123 n.1.
88. Cf. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). The Karnuth Court felt that
unrestricted crossing of the border between neighboring countries in time of war would con-
stitute a threat to the security of the State and might even encourage treason. See note 51
supra. In Karnuth, the Court was concerned with foot-passage but a similar argument can
be made for air travel as well.
89. Pakistani aircraft had to make a 2,400 mile detour because of the ban, make stop-
overs for refuelling in Sri Lanka, and pay extra airport tax. The ban affected eighty-two
scheduled flights per week. Application of the Government of Pakistan to the I.C.A.O.
Council dated Mar. 3, 1971, reprintedin Memorial of India, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdic-
tion of the I.C.A.O. Council, I.C.J. Pleadings 25, 88-91 (1973).
90. Contra The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4 (merits). The
Court stated that the non-necessary nature of the route and the existence of alternatives did
not prevent the Corfu Channel from being an international highway. However, the cases
can be distinguished on the difference between international straits, where transit rights ex-
ist, and national air space, where they do not.
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lowing for outbreaks of conflict would reduce the readiness of States to
enter into such agreements, a result ultimately prejudicial to the global
community.9' Evidently both India and Pakistan viewed the air agree-
ments as qualitatively different from other agreements about which
they made no such claims.92 States might perceive air agreements as
potentially more prejudicial to their security interests and thus expect
that such agreements will be subject to special consideration.
4. International Rights of Transit in Times of Crisis
Pakistan might have pressed its claim with a third legal strategy. The
divided character of its territory made communications by the most di-
rect route essential to its existence. The extent of its reliance on the
right of overflight estopped India from denying Pakistan a permanent
right of transit across Indian territory, a contention not borne out by
the facts.
In other contexts, however, the creation of such a right arguably has
prevented any deviation from an agreement, even during a conflict.
This argument has had its fullest appraisal in the context of inter-
oceanic canals.93 The three major examples (the Suez, Panama, and
Kiel Canals) are regulated by international agreements entered into by
a limited number of parties.94
Third parties rely on these routes and conduct their commercial af-
fairs on the assumption that the canals will remain open to foreign
shipping.95 Acceptance of international servitudes (or the legal right of
91. Cf. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15, 23-26 (Court admits the necessity of allowing some reserva-
tions (unilateral modifications) to ensure widest possible participation, but not reservations
that will gut the essential purposes of a convention).
92. The Indus Water Agreement, 1960, continued in effect, as did the Agreement to sub-
mit the Rann of Kutch dispute to arbitration. See Counter Memorial of Pakistan, Appeal
Relating to the Jurisdiction of the I.C.A.O. Council, I.C.J. Pleadings 369, 375 (1973). For
the decision in the Rann of Kutch Boundary Arbitration, see 17 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1
(1968).
93. See R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS (1964) for a full discus-
sion of the effect of war on transit through waterways.
94. Constantinople Convention, Oct. 29, 1888, [1889] Parl. Pap., Commercial No. 2
(Cmd. 5623), 171 Parry's T.S. 241 (Suez Canal); Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903,
United States-Panama, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431 (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty), succeeded
by Panama Canal Treaties, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, reprinted in 16 Irr'L LEG.
MATS. 1022 (1977); Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, 225 Parry's T.S. 188, arts. 380-86 (Kiel Canal).
95. Under long-established principles of treaty law, a third party can acquire no rights
under an agreement to which it is not a party. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, arts.
34-36 (conditions under which rights for third parties can be created). However, two major
legal doctrines consider interoceanic canals as exceptions so that the canals cannot be closed




international transit) would allow the general global need for open
communication routes always to override the particular interests of the
riparian State. International law recognizes such rights as conveyances
of territory and leaseholds; there seems no reason why such a doctrine
should not be adopted to protect the stability of international regimes
in the face of local conflicts.
96
The most persuasive dicta in favor of an international right of transit
through waterways (although the Court refrained from calling it a ser-
vitude) is found in the S.S. Wimbledon case.97 The Permanent Court
used far-reaching language to assert that where a waterway has been
"dedicated to international use" the riparian can no longer act at its
discretion to exclude other States. This view gives a higher priority to
the value of protection of communication routes than those pertaining
to neutrality. As such, it strongly supports the notion of an interna-
tional servitude from which States cannot deviate during times of crisis.
Two factors weigh against this forceful and radical conclusion. First,
the importance of the Treaty of Versailles may well have influenced the
Court to uphold its language to the fullest.98 Second, the Court ac-
servitudes over the canals. H. REID, INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES IN LAW AND PRACTICE
(1932); F. VALI, SERVITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1958).
[A]n international servitude is a real right, whereby the territory of one state is made
liable to permanent use by another state, for some specified purpose. . . . It establishes
a permanent legal relationship of territory to territory, unaffected by change of sover-
eignty in either of them, and terminable only by mutual consent, by renunciation on the
part of the dominant state, or by consolidation of the territories affected.
H. REID, supra, at 25.
The second doctrine is that a legal, although imperfect, right of international transit based
on the essential nature of global communications exists. See Lauterpacht, supra note 77.
Lauterpacht stated that the right was perfect and therefore enforceable, although he admit-
ted his view was controversial.
96. Admittedly, State practice has not always harmonized with the policy grounds enun-
ciated above. Throughout World Wars I and II, Britain restricted enemy shipping through
the Suez Canal; the United States acted similarly to close the Panama Canal to the enemy.
See J. OBIETA, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 13-17 (2d ed. 1970);
Smith, Beyond the Treaties: Limitations on Neutraliy in the Panamer Canal, 4 YALE STUD.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 18-22 (1977). These closures might indicate a pattern of accepted
State practice contrary to the idea of permanently open international canals. On the other
hand, the extent and severity of the warfare, coupled with the extremely high values at stake
for all parties, justified extreme measures. In the wartime context, closure of shipping routes
was among the least coercive of measures taken against the enemy.
97. See The S.S. Wimbledon, [1923] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. I. The case arose out of Ger-
many's refusal to allow passage through the Kiel Canal to a ship carrying munitions to
Poland during the Polish-Russian War of 1920. Germany asserted that its duties of neutral-
ity to both belligerents obliged it to refuse access to the ship. However, the Treaty of Ver-
sailles declared the Canal "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all
nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality." Treaty of Versailles, supra note
94, art. 380. Both Poland and Russia were at peace with Germany in 1920.
98. The Versailles Treaty was a major peace treaty, constitutive of public order in Eu-
rope and the world. Germany had denied access to the Canal to ships belonging to France
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knowledged that Germany would have been allowed greater freedom
of action if it had been at war. This explicit concession in the Versailles
Treaty suggests that the riparian's interest in its own protection would
receive priority when the conflict threatens its own security. Even with-
out the wording of the Treaty, many jurists contend that no State can
be deprived, or deprive itself, of its inherent right of self-defense. 99 No
State can be forced to allow an international right of transit where that
right would assist in its own destruction. 1' °
Judgments about the existence of such a threat have differed. The
international community reacted unfavorably to Egypt's closure of the
Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and the exercise of the right of visit and
search by Egypt. 10 These decisions provoked considerable protest 10 2
in contrast to the acquiescence that greeted the closing of the Suez and
Panama Canals during the two World Wars. 0 3 Though perhaps based
on sympathy for Israel, the protests over Egypt's action in 1967 also
reflected the view that, unlike world war, a localized conflict did not
justify closure. Closing the Suez Canal was not necessary for Egypt's
defense. Nor was it proportionate or reasonable in the light both of
Egypt's position that international acceptance of Israel represented a
and the United Kingdom. The Permanent Court heard the case shortly after the Treaty's
conclusion. The Court perhaps desired to give full effect to the Treaty's provisions to en-
dorse the new public order it created. At the least, no court would have wanted to approve a
German modification of an international commitment so soon after the peace settlement.
99. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SuBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, IN-
TERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF PASSAGE UNDER A NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATY (1976) (Pan-
ama will have inherent right of self-defense regardless of any new treaty provisions); Smith,
supra note 96.
100. See The S.S. Wimbledon, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1, at 36-37 (dissenting opinion
of Judges Anzilotti and Huber):
In this respect, it must be remembered that international conventions and more par-
ticularly those relating to commerce and communications are generally concluded hav-
ing regard to normal peace conditions. If, as the result of a war, a neutral or belligerent
State is faced with the necessity of taking extraordinary measures temporarily affecting
the application of such conventions in order to protect its neutrality or for the purpose
of national defence, it is entitled to do so even if no express reservations are made in the
convention ...
. .. The right of a State to adopt the course it considers best suited to the exigencies
of its security and to the maintenance of its integrity, is so essential a right that, in case
of doubt, treaty stipulations cannot be interpreted as limiting it ...
101. See Baxter, Passage of Ships through International Waterways in Time of War, 31
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (1955); Khadduri, The Closure of the Suez Canal to IsraellShipping,
33 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1968); J. OBIETA, supra note 96; Gross, Passage through the
Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo andIsrael Ships, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 530 (1957); Lapidoth,
The Reopened Suez Canal in International Law, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 1 (1976).
102. Protests were lodged by the Netherlands (no less than three times), Turkey, the
United Kingdom (at least ten times), the United States (twelve times), and France (twenty-
two times). Gross, supra note 101, at 538.
103. See note 96 supra.
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continuing threat and the extraordinary nature of a demand to close an
international waterway. Egypt claimed a state of belligerency between
itself and Israel existed and conveyed belligerent rights, including those
of self-defense and the duty to protect the Canal. This behavior was
consistent with Egypt's refusal to recognize Israel and allow Israeli air-
craft to use its airspace. 1°4
These international canal incidents demonstrate how the need for re-
liable and secure communications for international trade and security
has increased the justifications for guaranteeing certain strategic com-
munication networks. Only the most severe conflict situation, threaten-
ing the territorial independence and political integrity of the riparian
State, can justify the most extreme demands to terminate or suspend
these rights. Lesser demands of modification such as the imposition of
conditions for transit, might more readily be upheld.10 5 Because public
necessity is the basis for a right of transit, there should be a correspond-
ing public duty to act collectively both to protect the communication
route and to provide security for the threatened State.
Conclusion
Analysis of these examples of State practice suggests that the appro-
priate response to demands relating to the performance of an agree-
ment has to be formulated with reference to all the factors at play in
any given conflict situation. The major conditioning factors, which de-
termine the reasonableness and proportionality of the demands, can be
divided into two categories: those relating to the causes, extent, and
conduct of the conflict, and those pertaining to the values projected by
a particular agreement.
104. The international community condemned Egypt's selective closure of the Canal,
but not the ban on air transit by Israeli aircraft. Such a reaction emphasizes the legal differ-
ences between these two modes of transport. Indeed, it makes even more controversial Lau-
terpacht's conception of a perfectable right of air transit, see notes 77 and 95 supra.
However, the response does lend support to the conception of a permanently open interna-
tional waterway.
Security Council Resolutions on peace in the Middle East affirm the necessity of guaran-
teed freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. See S.C. Res. 242,
22 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967); S.C. Res.
338,28 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973). The word-
ing of these Resolutions seems to support the assertion of permanent transit rights.
105. The 1951 Security Council Resolution on the Middle East, S.C. Res. 95, 6 U.N.
SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/6/Rev. 1 (1965), does support a
potential claim for modification at a time of conflict rather than for termination or suspen-
sion. See also The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4, 28, where the
I.C.J. stated that Albania "in view of these exceptional circumstances [ie., war with Greece]
would have been justified in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships
through the strait, but not in prohibiting such passage....
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The intensity and severity of the actual conflict is decisive. A major
war, fought in many arenas, involving vast resources, and representing
a fundamental threat to the values of the opposing States, will render
reasonable more extreme demands relating to agreements than claims
made in the context of a localized border war with limited arenas and
purposes.106 The duration of the conflict also is relevant. A brief con-
flict, however intensely fought, will not justify demands that would ex-
cessively disrupt the stability of international agreements. Excessive
demands would be disproportionate to the duration of the conflict. If
the underlying conflict continues only in a generally passive form, with
spasmodic outbreaks of overt conflict, then States can formulate their
expectations based on this continuing situation. 10 7 There should be no
need to make extreme demands when a brief conflict actually erupts.
The degree of ideological difference between the protagonists in part
may determine the perceived threat to the group values of either party
and influence the seriousness with which they view the conflict and the
intensity with which they fight. Each State's desire to protect its ideol-
ogy accounts, in some measure, for the intensity of the prolonged dis-
pute between Cuba and the United States.108 While perhaps excessive
for a confrontation between a superpower and a small power, the ideo-
logical perspective may help in perceiving extreme demands as more
reasonable than similar demands between States with essentially com-
patible values.
The decision-maker must also consider the impact of the demands
on third parties. A demand that threatens the interests of a super-
power, raising the possibility of its entry into the conflict, creates a
much greater danger to world order. This factor plays a major role in
inhibiting the demands that States make in time of conflict.
The true motivation for a particular demand also needs examination.
If its purpose is in fact peripheral to the central conflict and thus not
necessary for its resolution, then the demand will not be deemed rea-
sonable. The behavior of the parties in making their demands known
is relevant in this connection. Arbitrary and unilateral action is less
likely to be upheld than demands made according to regular proce-
dures, through diplomatic channels, that keep the way open for
106. Compare the closure of the Suez and Panama Canals during World War I and II,
note 96 supra, with the Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal following the 1949 Armistice, text
accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
107. See the discussion of the India-Pakistan "serial war", text accompanying notes 84-
85 supra.





Demands that other elites consider unreasonable, unnecessary, or
disproportionate may provoke their own political, if not legal, sanc-
tions. States that too readily excuse modifying or terminating an inter-
national obligation may find other States less willing to negotiate
agreements with them. The benefits of international life, such as credit
and credibility, may become less easy to -obtain. Alternatively, the in-
ternational community may signify a judgment of reasonableness by
meeting demands with acquiescence and lack of protest. 10 Such de-
mands should not cause long-term adverse effects to, the claimant State
and may be instrumental in formulating new prescriptions for the
future.
The examples of State practice chosen demonstrate that it is impossi-
ble to predict with certainty either the demands or the appropriate re-
sponses that will be made. An authoritative international body should
continue work on this incomplete and confused area of the law of inter-
national agreements. A Resolution of the Institute of International
Law, whose Fifth Commission has been working on the problem over a
number of years, might fill this gap."' Meanwhile, a few proposals
might be offered.
Participants to an agreement must make known their demands to
other parties interested in the agreement. By putting the onus on the
claimant party, this requirement also allows for some certainty. Others
involved can reconsider their own positions and future actions in the
light of the demands. Where no demands are made, the agreement
presumably will continue in force. At the conclusion of a period of
crisis, parties should again make clear their past positions relating to
any agreements for the duration of that crisis. This desire for publicity
of demands is especially important because formal declarations of war
have become so rare."
2
The International Court of Justice in the Iranian Hostages case"
3
109. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, arts. 65-67; Chicago Convention, supra note
19, art. 89.
110. See, e.g., the lack of sanction under G.A.T.. or the I.M.F. Agreement following
the 1971 U.S. devaluation of the dollar, note 6 supra.
111. See The Effects of-4rmed Conflicts on Treaties, supra note 63. This report contains
responses to a questionnaire on the topic from such eminent jurists as H.W. Briggs, M.S.
McDougal, S. Verosta, S. Rosenne, and J. Zourek. A draft resolution for discussion is also
included.
112. See note 8 supra. Notification and publicity requirements, see note 109 supra, also
have the ancillary benefit of compelling the development of State practice. Public claims
will either provoke international protest or meet with international acquiescence and
thereby provide guidance for the future.
113. [1980] I.C.J. 4.
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refused to allow serious crisis conditions between States to overturn or
even suspend fundamental international values. This case did recog-
nize the need to weigh the conflicting interests of the parties as well as
the purpose and policy of the agreement itself. The judgment protected
the interests of third parties with legitimate expectations based on the
continuing sanctity of diplomatic premises.114 The case demonstrates
that an agreement which protects essential values for a wide range of
actors and on which many legitimate expectations have been based
must be less easily overturned than a bilateral agreement incorporating
limited objectives. Similarly, it seems foolish to allow abrupt termina-
tion of a long-term treaty on whose stability many participants have
properly relied. Claims for suspension should be considered more rea-
sonable when they relate to short-term agreements that do not project
long-term and far-reaching policies.
Ultimately, the decision-maker must resolve this question through a
process of interpretation of the agreement, taking into account all the
many and various factors, such as the intensity, duration, arenas, and
objectives of the conflict, in order to determine the reasonableness and
necessity of the demands. No one of these factors can be regarded as
conclusive and at all times the concerns of all interested parties must be
weighed. Formal guidelines incorporating these principles would be of
considerable value in the interpretive process.
114. The multilateral character of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular
Relations, supra note 68, is not in itself conclusive of the expectations of third parties.
Whether an agreement is bilateral or multilateral is another relevant factor for considera-
tion. The effect of crisis on international agreements cannot be answered merely by refer-
ence to the category of agreement, nor is its purpose determinative.
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